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IN RE MANSFIELD TIRE
& RUBBER COMPANY: A PENALTY
BY ANY OTHER NAME
IS NOT A PENALTY
The Bankruptcy Code provides an elaborate set of rules setting
priorities for claims against a bankrupt estate.' 'Chapter 7 governs
bankruptcies which result in liquidation of the estate.2 Chapter 11
governs bankruptcy proceedings in which the debtor plans to reor-
ganize and continue its business.3 In both situations, section 507
priorities obtain.4
Under section 507(a)(7)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors
owed excise taxes are among those given priority claims.' Con-
1. The Bankruptcy Code is codified in title 11 of the United States Code. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1-15,326 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
2. See id. §§ 701-66.
3. See id. §§ 1101-74.
4. Id. §§ 726 (requiring liquidating distributions under chapter 7 to comply with §
507 priorities), I129(a)(9) (conditioning approval of a plan on payment of debts given
priority under § 507).
5. Id. § 507(a)(7)(E). Section 507(a) provides in part:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order.
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to
the extent that such claims are for -
(E) an excise tax on -
(i) a transaction occurring before the date of
the filing of the petition for which a return, if
require4 is last due, under applicable law or
under any extension, after three years before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
(ii) if a return is not require4 a transaction
occurring during the three years immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition;
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versely, under section 726(a)(4) of chapter 7, claims for penalties
are expressly subordinated to the claims of all other creditors.6
While these rules appear clear and easy to apply, certain claims for
exactions labeled excise taxes under the Internal Revenue Code
(the "Revenue Code") resemble penalties. The courts have, there-
fore, addressed whether a tax labeled by Congress as an excise tax
in the Revenue Code should be given priority automatically under
section 507(a)(7)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code or subordinated as a
penalty, if the true nature of the exaction is a penalty, under sec-
tion 726(a)(4).' Until recently, every court addressing the issue
determined whether the true nature of the exaction was more akin
to an excise tax or to a penalty.9
In United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Company (In re
Mansfield Tire & Rubber Company), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became the first court to hold that an
exaction labeled by Congress as an excise tax under the Revenue
Code was entitled to priority under section 507(a)(7)(E) of the
Bankruptcy Code without regard to its true nature as a penalty.1"
This comment compares the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit with the
Id. § 507(a) (emphasis added). Exise taxes are one of seven types of taxes given priority
under the Bankruptcy Code. The others include certain income, property, withholding and
employment taxes, certain customs duties and penalties related to any of these governmen-
tal claims given priority. Id.
6. Id. § 726(a)(4). See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text for a brief discussion
of whether § 726, which expressly applies only to chapter 7 liquidations, applies to chap-
ter 11 cases by analogy. For purposes of this comment, application of § 726 to a chapter
11 case is assumed.
7. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4911 (tax on excess lobbying expenses incurred by public
charities), 4941 (tax on certain persons engaging in self-dealing transactions with a private
foundation), 4971 (tax on an employer for failure to properly fund a pension plan), 4980
(tax on an employer upon reversion of pension plan assets). All of the foregoing are ex-
pressly labelled by Congress as excise taxes. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4041-5000 (Subtitle D,
-Miscellaneous Excise Taxes").
8. See United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rub-
ber Co.), 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Unsecured Creditors' Committee
of C-T of Virginia (In re C-T Virginia, Inc.), No. 91-0026-1, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16,741 (W.D. Va. Oct. 30, 1991); Mahon v. United States (In re Unified Control Sys-
tems, Inc.), 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978); United Steelworkers of America v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 103 B.R. 672 (W.D. Pa.
1989); United States v. Feinblatt (In re Kline), 403 F. Supp. 974 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd.
per curiam, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977). See also infra text accompanying notes 11-30.
9. See C-T Virginia, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,741; Unified Control Systems, 586
F.2d 1036; Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 103 B.R. 672; Kline, 403 F. Supp. 974.
10. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1059. The Mansfield Tire court also addressed whether
an excise tax should be subordinated under equitable principles. See id. at 1061-62. A
discussion of this portion of the court's opinion is beyond the scope of this comment.
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reasoning of the courts taking a contrary position and argues that
the conclusion and reasoning of the Sixth Circuit should prevail.
Therefore, courts should not attempt to ascertain the true nature of
an excise tax, but they should instead grant priority automatically
to claims for the tax under section 507(a)(7)(E) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
I. CASES OUTSIDE THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Only a few courts have addressed the priority status of claims
for excise taxes that resemble penalties.'" Except for the Sixth
Circuit, however, the courts addressing the issue have held that the
penalty-like excise tax claim was subordinated to the claims of all
other creditors." This section focuses on the rationale the courts
used to support their conclusion.
In In re Kline, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland considered whether the taxes imposed by sections
4941 and 4944 of the Revenue Code should be characterized as
excise taxes or as penalties for purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.' 3 Sections 4941 and 4944 of the Revenue Code impose
excise taxes on certain individuals and on private foundations when
the individuals and the private foundations engage in prohibited
transactions.' 4 The Kline court held that although the taxes im-
posed by sections 4941 and 4944 were labeled excise taxes, the
taxes were actually penalties not entitled to priority under the
Bankruptcy Code.'
5
11. See supra note 8.
12. United States v. Unsecured Creditors, Committee of C-T of Virginia (In re C-T
Virginia, Inc.), No. 91-0026-L, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16,741, at *4 (W.D. Pa. October
30, 1991) (employing the usual test but concluding that 26 U.S.C. § 4980 did not resem-
ble a penalty); Mahon v. United States (In re Unified Control Systems, Inc.), 586 F.2d
1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1978); United Steelworkers of America v. Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. (In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 103 B.R. 672, 694 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Unit-
ed States v. Feinblatt (In re Kline), 403 F. Supp. 974, 978-79 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977).
13. Kline, 403 F. Supp. at 976.
14. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4941 (taxing certain individuals), 4944 (taxing private foundation for
jeopardizing its tax-exempt status and foundation manager who participates in actions
creating such jeopardy).
15. Kline, 403 F. Supp. at 978-79. The Kline case arose before Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978. At the time of the Kline decision, the Bankruptcy Act disal-
lowed all claims for penalties against a bankrupt estate. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541,
§ 57, 30 Stat. 544, 560 (repealed 1978) (reprinted as amended before 1978, 11 U.S.C.A.
app. § 93(j) (West 1979)). The act provided priority for a general category of claims
termed 'taxes* without specifically stating categories of taxes. See Pub. L. No. 90-157, §
10711992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The court set forth a number of arguments for its holding.
First, the bankruptcy scheme then in effect gave priority to taxes
owed to governmental units, but it also disallowed debts owed to
governmental units as penalties, except to the extent the penalties
constituted actual pecuniary losses incurred by the governmental
unit.16 Second, adoption of sections 4941 and 4944 of the Reve-
nue Code was intended to correct abuses relating to private foun-
dations. 7 Third, the court stated that the Bankruptcy Act "imple-
ment[ed] a broad congressional policy against punishing the inno-
cent creditors of a bankrupt ... [and] accomplishe[d] this purpose
by providing that claims for 'penalties' shall not be allowed against
the bankrupt estate." 8
The Kline court therefore concluded that the true nature of the
tax should be the controlling factor in determining its character for
bankruptcy claim purposes. Focusing on congressional purpose in
imposing the exactions at issue, the court found that the taxes were
imposed to discourage through economic punishment abuses by pri-
vate foundations.'9 Lack of any evidence that Congress intended
the exactions to approximate any actual pecuniary harm to the
federal government buttressed the court's decision.20
While Congress had clearly labeled the requisite payments as
taxes, the court refused to allow the title given them to be conclu-
sive of the exaction's true nature.2' "An enactment which has as
its purpose the punishment of conduct perceived as wrongful
should be deemed a 'penalty' under [section] 57j [of the Bankrupt-
cy Act] regardless of the terminology employed by the legisla-
ture .... [I]t Would fly in the face of [section] 57j of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to give such assessments a priority over the claims of
entirely innocent creditors .... 22 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the Kline court's
opinion as its own.23
1, 81 Stat. 511, 511-12 (1967) (repealed in 1978) (reprinted as amended before repeal, 11
U.S.C.A app. § 104(a) (West 1979)). The current Bankruptcy Code subordinates, but does
not disallow, certain claims for penalties against a bankrupt estate, and grants priority to
certain specific taxes. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726.
16. Kline, 403 F. Supp. at 976.
17. Id. at 976-77.
18. Id. at 977. See also supra note 15.
19. Id. at 977-78.
20. Id. at 978.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 978-79.
23. United States v. Feinblatt (In re Kline), 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977). After the
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In In re Unified Control Systems, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also addressed the priority status of
section 4941 of the Revenue Code.24 Looking to the context of
the tax statutes instead of the labels employed by Congress, the
court concluded that the exactions imposed by section 4941 were
penalties.' In so doing, the court relied heavily on the Kline de-
cision."
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code after the disputes
addressed in Kline and Unified Control Systems arose.27  Two
changes made by Congress directly relate to the present issue.
First, instead of giving priority to a broad category entitled "taxes,"
section 507 specifies the priority given to certain expressly stated
taxes.28  Excise taxes are expressly stated in that section.29  Sec-
ond, penalties are no longer disallowed, but are subordinated to the
claims of other creditors,"0 or are granted priority."1 Whether the
courts' view regarding excise tax priority was to be affected by-
these changes remained to be seen.
In 1989, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania addressed the priority status of a claim
based on section 4971 of the Revetiue Code.32 Section 4971 of
the Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on employers, who fail to
Sixth Circuit decided In re Mansfield Tire, a district court in the Fourth Circuit affirmed
a bankruptcy court's analysis patterned on Kline. See United States v. Unsecured
Creditors' Committee of C-T of Virginia (In re C-T Virginia, Inc.), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16,741 (Oct. 30, 1991). The district court acknowledged the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach in Mansfield Tire but noted that inquiry into the purposes of the exactions fol-
lowed the approach of the Fourth Circuit. Id. The district court reversed the bankruptcy
court decision because the district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion
that § 4980 of the Revenue Code was a penalty rather than a tax. Id.
24. Mahon v. United States (In re Unified Control Systems, Inc.), 586 F.2d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1978).
25. Id. at 1039 (relying on "[t]he language of the [Internal Revenue Code], its legis-
lative history, the graduated levels of the sanctions imposed, and the almost confiscatory
level of the exaction assessed").
26. See id. at 1037-39.
27. See Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2583 (1978); Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 358 (1984)
(both laws currently codified in Title 11 of the United States Code).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
29. Id. § 507(a)(7)(E). See supra note 5 for the text of § 507.
30. Id. § 726(a)(4).
31. Id. § 507(a)(7)(G). Penalties arising from taxes given priority under § 507 receive
priority if related to actual pecuniary loss.
32. United Steelworkers of America v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Wheel-
ing-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 103 B.R. 672 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
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fund sufficiently their pension plan.33 The court reviewed the leg-
islative history of section 4971 and concluded that the tax imposed
was clearly a penalty for bankruptcy purposes.' The court, how-
ever, did not hold that section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code there-
fore dictated subordination of the claim for the excise tax. The
court instead held that equitable considerations dictated disallow-
ance of the claim.35 As a result, this case failed to clarify the im-
pact, if any, of the 1978 overhaul of the bankruptcy statutes. The
court's inquiry into the exaction's nature, however, resembled old
case law. By expressly relying on Kline and Unified Control Sys-
tems, the court suggested that pre-amendment case law continued to
govern the issue.
II. IN RE MANSFIELD TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
A. Procedural History
In 1979, The Mansfield Tire & Rubber Company filed a vol-
untary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio.36 The Internal Revenue Service filed a proof of claim
which included a claim for excise taxes due under section 4971 of
the Revenue Code imposing an excise tax on employers failing to
fund properly their pension plan.37 After reviewing the law under
the pre-1978 Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court briefly dis-
cussed the 1978 amendments.38 The court stated that "the policy
of protecting innocent creditors from the impact of punitive debts
was continued [in the 1978 amendments]."39 Citing Kline and
Unified Control Systems, the bankruptcy court also stated that "it is
abundantly clear that the mere labeling of an exaction as a tax is
not determinative of its character."4"
After reviewing the language and legislative history of section
4971, the bankruptcy court held that the amounts imposed by sec-
33. 26 U.S.C. § 4971.
34. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 103 B.R. at 694.
35. Id. The court did not cite statutory support, but declared "[i]t is inherently unfair
to punish the debtor's creditors." Id.
36. The facts of the proceedings appear in In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 80
B.R. 395, 395-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
37. Id. at 396.
38. Id. at 397.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 398.
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tion 4971 constituted a penalty and not a tax for bankruptcy pur-
poses.4" Having thus decided, the bankruptcy court reviewed the
appropriate priority of the claim. The options available to the court
were subordination under section 726(a)(4) or under section 510(c)
of the Bankruptcy Code.42 Although section 726 is expressly ap-
plicable to chapter 7 liquidation cases only, the court noted that the
section has been applied by analogy to chapter 11 cases by some,
but not all, courts.43 The court avoided the controversy, however,
and subordinated the Service's claims under section 510(c), which
allows subordination for equitable considerations."
On appeal, the United States District Court for the, Northern
District of Ohio affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.45 Again
disregarding the label given by Congress, the district court chose to
focus on the purpose of section 4971 of the Revenue Code.46 The
district court concluded that the section 4971 taxes "are penalties
for [section] 507(a) purposes." 47
B. The Sixth Circuit Opinion
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the excise tax-penalty issue pre-
sented in In re Mansfield- Tire & Rubber Company in a manner
radically different from previous decisions addressing the issue.48
The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,4 9 sup-
porting the reversal with arguments focusing on Bankruptcy Code
language rather than on intent and purpose under the Revenue
Code.
Noting that the term 'excise tax' is not defined in the Bank-
41. Id. at 399-400.
42. Id. at 400-01.
43. Id. at 401. The bankruptcy court cited Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate
Setting Commission of Massachusetts (In re Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc.), 36 B.R.
672 (Bankr. Mass. 1984) and Compton Corp. v. United States (In re Compton Corp.), 40
B.R. 875 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) as authority for applying § 726 to a chapter 11 case
by analogy, and it cited In re Colin, 44 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) as one case
refusing to apply § 726 by analogy.
44. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
45. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber
Co.), 120 B.R. 862, 868 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
46. Id. at 864-65.
47. Id. at 866. The district court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to sub-
ordinate the claims under section 510(c). See id. at 866-68.
48. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber
Co.), 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 1056.
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ruptcy Code, the court concluded that Congress did not intend a
meaning peculiar to that Code.50 Congress granted priority to ex-
cise taxes without reference to their regulatory nature or to pecuni-
ary loss. 51 While many taxes labeled excise taxes discourage con-
duct deemed wrongful, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legisla-
tive history indicate that certain excise taxes were to be treated as
other than excise taxes.
52
As to the policy of protecting innocent creditors, the Sixth
Circuit was unsympathetic. Section 4971 was in existence as an
excise tax when Congress enacted the current Bankruptcy Code in
1978. 5' While 'excise tax' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress certainly intended to include those taxes labeled as such
in the Revenue Code when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code.54 In addition, a host of taxes were given priority over "in-
nocent creditors" despite any harm they may suffer as a result
thereof.55
The Sixth Circuit therefore stated that where Congress gave
unqualified priority under the Bankruptcy Code to excise taxes and
Congress also titled a specific exaction in the Revenue Code an
excise tax, the court would not intervene to recharacterize the exac-
tion as something other than an excise tax. 56
I. ANALYSIS
This comment concludes that the analysis employed by the
Sixth Circuit in the Mansfield Tire decision is more appropriate
than that employed by other courts. The statutory language of both
the Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code support the court's
analysis. In addition, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code
does not clearly support the decisions typified by Kline. And the
legislative history of the tax statutes at issue in these cases show
that while the purpose of the statutes may have been punitive in
character, Congress consciously labeled such exactions excise taxes.




54. Id. at 1058-59.
55. Id. at 1059.
56. Id. The Sixth Circuit also stated that such deference to legislative labels did not
extend to legislative entities other than Congress. Id. at 1059. The Sixth Circuit also
reversed the holding of the district court regarding equitable subordination under § 510(c).
Id. at 1061-62.
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Further, while the Kline decision and its progeny relied heavily on
the policy of protecting innocent creditors, Kline was decided under
a bankruptcy structure that was much more ambiguous than the
current Bankruptcy Code, and the opinion therefore should carry
little or no persuasive weight in cases decided under the current
code.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Both the language of section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code and
the current judicial formulation of statutory interpretation support a
literal reading of section 507. Section 507 expressly sets forth the
priority to be granted to excise taxes. 7 Other than restricting
claims by the timeframes during which a claim for excise taxes
arose, section 507 does not in any way qualify the priority given
excise taxes.5" "Where Congress has exercised its constitutional
power and deemed an exaction an 'excise tax', the question [of
whether a particular exaction is an 'excise tax' within the Bank-
ruptcy Code] has been answered." 59
In addition, the current United States Supreme Court has re-
peatedly interpreted statutory language strictly.' Absent a result
completely at odds with the purpose of a statute, the plain meaning
of the statute controls.6
While the Bankruptcy Code may evidence some intent to
protect innocent creditors from certain penalties resulting from the
debtor's conduct, since 1978 the creditors are not completely pro-
tected against such penalties. In fact, while claims for some penal-
ties may be subordinated under section 726, section 507 expressly
gives priority to penalties related to claims under 507.62 While
57. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(E). See supra note 5 for the complete text of § 507(a).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(E).
59. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1059.
60. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (construing amendments
of the bankruptcy laws as not affecting prior law absent legislative history to the contrary
and declaring that -silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling" where the
statute is unambiguous); Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 112 S. CL
515, 519-521 (1991) (starting with the language of a statute, presuming plain language ex-
presses intent and allowing only conclusive legislative history to counter the presumption);
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. CL 599, 604 (1991) ("When . . . the terms of a statute
[are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional circumstanc-
es.'); Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2636 (1991) (finding that when language
is unambiguous, judicial inquiry ends).
61. Eg., Demarest, I1l S. CL at 604.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(G).
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priority is limited to penalties for which the government can show
pecuniary loss, section 507(a)(7)(G) counters the argument that the
Bankruptcy Code evidences a general policy to protect creditors
from punitive exactions.63 Therefore, interpreting section 507 as
granting priority to excise taxes which resemble penalties is not
completely at odds with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.'
Further, as pointed out by the Sixth Circuit, a host of exac-
tions entitled excise taxes in the Revenue Code resemble penal-
ties.65 Most of these taxes were in existence when the Bankruptcy
Code was enacted.66 When Congress grants an unqualified priority
to excise taxes and the Revenue Code contains excise taxes, it
appears that Congress wishes to grant priority to taxes by label,
rather than by purpose. Even Black's Law Dictionary currently rec-
ognizes that the term "excise tax" extends to practically every tax
under the Revenue Code other than income taxes.67
Finally, consider the status of the excise tax debt if that claim
is not granted priority under section 507. The bankruptcy and
district courts addressing Mansfield Tire concluded that the claim
was to be subordinated. 68 Another possibility exists, however. Sec-
tion 523 of the Bankruptcy Code exempts certain debts from dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 69 Among the exemptions from discharge is
a debt representing a non-pecuniary loss penalty owed to a govern-
mental unit not specified in section 507(a)(7). 70 Therefore, it ap-
pears that if the claim for an excise tax is not granted priority
63. Note that under the pre-1978 bankruptcy laws, penalties were completely disallowed
except to the extent of pecuniary loss. See supra note 15 and text accompanying notes
27-31. Not only are penalties now allowed, certain penalties are actually granted priority.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(A)(7)(G).
64. While one may disagree with the Supreme Court's method of statutory interpreta-
tion, the Sixth Circuit must defer to that method. Failure to defer would merely result in
an expensive and time-consuming appeal which would probably end in a reversal of the
decision.
65. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1058-59. See also supra note 7.
66. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1058.
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 563 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "excise tax" as "A tax
imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment
of a privilege . . . .A tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods or on the carrying
on of an occupation or activity, or a tax on the transfer of property. In current usage the
term has been extended to include various license fees and practically every internal
revenue tax except the income tax . . . . - (emphasis added)).
68. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber
Co.); 120 B.R. 862, 866-68 (N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 80
B.R. 395, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
70. Id. § 523(a)(7).
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under section 507 because of the tax's punitive nature, the debtor
should not be granted relief from the indebtedness through subordi-
nation of the claim. The court should merely refuse to grant the
debtor a discharge from the debt.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code and of the
specific sections of the Revenue Code at issue are also relevant to
whether section 507 should be strictly construed to grant priority to
all excise taxes. Unfortunately, the legislative history of section
4971, which is quite clear, is irrelevant if the legislative history of
section 507 is ambiguous. If the legislative history of section 507
does not strongly suggest a different reading, the plain language of
section 507 will prevail.
The legislative history of section 4971 of the Revenue Code is
straightforward. Enacted as part of ERISA,71 section 4971 was
clearly intended to be punitive, but was also clearly intended to be
an excise tax. The following language appears verbatim in both the
report of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the report
of the Senate Committee on Finance:
The bill also provides new and more effective penal-
ties where employers fail to meet the funding standards. In
the past, an attempt has been made to enforce the relatively
weak funding standards existing under present law by pro-
viding for immediate vesting of the employees' rights, to
the extent funded, under plans which do not meet these
standards. This procedure, however, has proved to be de-
fective since it does not directly penalize those responsible
for the underfunding. For this reason, the bill places the
obligation for funding and the penalty for underfunding on
the person on whom it belongs - namely, the employer.
This is achieved by imposing an excise tax where the
71. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, ch. 43, §
4971, 88 Stat. 829, 920 (1974).
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employer fails to meet the funding standards . . .
Therefore, both houses of Congress were aware that section
4971 constituted a penalty labeled an excise tax. Section 4971 was
intended to be punitive in nature. The texts of the reports also
support an intentional codification of section 4971 in the Revenue
Code under the excise tax subchapter, instead of under the penalty
sections. However, this legislative purpose is relevant only if sec-
tion 507 gives priority to a select set of excise taxes.
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, though fairly
extensive, is ambiguous. Few statements directly relevant to excise
tax priority exist. One House Report contains the following state-
ment:
H.R. 8200 modifies current law with respect to the tax
priority. The kinds of taxes entitled to priority under H.R.
8200 closely follows the categories granted priority under
the Bankruptcy Act, though taxes that are fines or penalties
are not entitled to priority, even to the extent of actual
pecuniary loss .... [W]ith respect to other taxes, such as
customs, excise, and property taxes, it is easier for a taxing
authority to discover a delinquency .... "
While this report seems to indicate that no penalties were allowed
priority,74 the clear language of section 507(a)(7)(G) contradicts
the supposed legislative intent, at least to the extent of pecuniary
loss. 75 In addition, a separate statement regarding legislative intent
seems directly to contradict the House Report. One legislator was
quoted as saying in reference to section 507:
All Federal, State or local taxes generally considered or
expressly treated as excises are covered by this category,
including sales taxes, estate and gift taxes, gasoline and
special fuel taxes, and wagering and truck taxes. 76
72. H. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,
4694-95 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 393, 93d Cong., 2d sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4909-10 (emphasis added). The Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel court cited
the above language but did not include the second paragraph. See United Steelworkers of
America v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.), 103
B.R. 672, 694 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
73. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 90 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6151.
74. The Report is unclear regarding whether prior law or the house bill (or both) dis-
allows penalties.
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(A)(7)(G).
76. 124 Congressional Record 32,392, 32,416 (1978) (emphasis added), reprinted in
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While the statement of one legislator is not conclusive," this
statement appears more aligned than the statement of the House
Report with the express language of section 507. Therefore, the
legislative history of section 507 is inconclusive at best. Absent
clear contrary intent, the plain meaning of the statute must pre-
vail.78
One legislative interpretation argument exists for retaining the
inquiry into the true nature of an excise tax. The analysis followed
in Kline and Unified Control Systems was settled law when the
current Bankruptcy Code was enacted.7 9 Therefore, the legal anal-
ysis should continue to apply absent a clear legislative intent to
overrule the analysis.80 Since the legislative history is ambiguous,
no clear intent to overrule precedent exists and perhaps the Kline
approach should continue to apply.
The argument, however, is flawed. First, section 507 now ex-
pressly grants priority to excise taxes. 8' Therefore, section 507
implicitly overrules Kline and similar cases. Second, while most
penalties were disallowed and penalties representing pecuniary loss
were subordinated under the pre-1978 bankruptcy scheme, such is
no longer the case.82 "Where the language [of a bankruptcy stat-




While the temptation exists to define congressional policy un-
der the Bankruptcy Code as a broad mandate to protect innocent
creditors, the same Code also evidences a policy to protect govern-
ment revenue of almost every nature. As the Sixth Circuit stated:
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6567 (statement of Rep. Edwards on presentation to the House
of an amendment to Senate's substituted bill).
77. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991)
("Where [the statutory text] contains a phrase that is unambiguous, . . .we do not permit
it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees
during the course of the enactment process.").
78. See, e.g., Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519-
21 (1991).
79. Kline was decided in 1975. In hindsight at least, Kline was regarded as the land-
mark case.
80. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773, 779 (1992).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(E).
82. See supra note 15.
83. Dewnsup, 112 S.Ct. at 779.
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With respect to the trustees' argument that the debtors'
innocent creditors will bear the cost of prioritizing the
government's claims, we needn't concern ourselves with
that policy decision. Congress has already made that
choice .... Whatever general policy against giving priori-
ty to penalty debts may exist, Congress has chosen to give
priority to excise taxes without distinguishing among them
based upon a court's view of their purpose or nature. This
Congress clearly may do.'
The Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code are creatures of
the legislature. Congress, in deciding whether to tax certain activi-
ty, is restricted only by the Constitution. 5 Similarly, whether
Congress provides a vehicle by which debtors in bankruptcy can be
relieved of certain debt is entirely up to them. 6 Having created
that vehicle, Congress may choose to prioritize claims as it sees fit,
even if innocent creditors are injured.
Further, the facility with which the courts continued to rely on
Kline after the 1978 overhaul of the bankruptcy scheme is trou-
bling. Kline addressed a statute which contained a more obvious
contradiction: taxes to governmental entities were entitled to priori-
ty, but debts to governmental entities representing penalties were
expressly subordinated to the extent of pecuniary loss and disal-
lowed otherwise.8 7 The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly sub-
ordinate or disallow penalties under chapter 11. Chapter 11 does,
however, contain a clear priority for certain taxes and penalties.8 8
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code does not contain a contradiction as
manifest as under the older bankruptcy laws. Thus, courts' contin-
ued reliance on Kline to support their inquiry regarding a statute's
true nature is inappropriate absent a conscious and well-reasoned
decision that pre-1978 law continues to apply.
The decision of the Sixth Circuit rests on solid ground. How-
ever, assuming the decision is wrong, any harm caused by the
decision is not irrevocable. The decision is based on statutory
84. United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber
Co.), 942 F. 2d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1991).
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405
(1938).
86. Id. cl. 4 (authorizing Congress power to establish uniform laws regardhig bankrupt-
cy).
87. See supra note 15.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
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interpretation. If Congress in fact meant for the courts to continue
to distinguish between taxes by their nature and not their title,
Congress can amend the Bankruptcy Code to express more accu-
rately their intention. Should Congress so act, the courts will be
justified in applying again Kline and its progeny. Until then, the
clearest import of section 507 is that claims for excise taxes, re-
gardless of whether they resemble more closely taxes or penalties,
are entitled to priority.
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